Liability ยท Smeehuijzen in the NJB ยท 2026-05-26
Smeehuijzen: the Dutch Protocol does not hold up as a legal yardstick
Lodewijk Smeehuijzen, professor of private law at VU Amsterdam, set out in the Dutch Lawyers' Journal (Nederlands Juristenblad) why a court cannot simply treat the Dutch Protocol as the prevailing medical-professional standard. His reasoning is structural: a protocol that, in the authors' view, doubtfully meets the first and fails the other two conditions that would make it a yardstick cannot serve as one.
What a protocol does in a liability case
Every liability case turns on the norm against which a physician's conduct is measured. To decide whether a clinician acted as a good clinician, courts ordinarily fall back on the medical-professional standard โ and that standard is filled in, to a large degree, by the protocols and guidelines in force. Act in line with the protocol, the conventional logic runs, and you have acted with due care.
Smeehuijzen, together with Smids and Hoekstra, turns that logic around. In NJB 2023/1772 they argue that a protocol can play that norm-setting role only if it itself satisfies three conditions. A court may adopt the protocol as a yardstick only once all three are met. The authors argue that it is highly doubtful whether the Dutch Protocol (2018), the Quality Standard Transgender Care โ Somatic on which Dutch care for children is based, meets the first condition, and that it meets neither the second nor the third.
Three conditions for a norm-setting protocol
- Evidence-based. The protocol rests on sound scientific evidence of efficacy and safety.
- Limited medical-ethical charge. The intervention does not engage weighty ethical interests on which reasonable people may differ.
- Adequate development process. The protocol came about through a careful, controlled procedure.
Condition 1 โ the evidence base is weak
The authors point out that no systematic review underlies the Dutch Protocol (2018), that the countries that did carry out systematic reviews found the evidence too light (NICE rated it "very low certainty"), and that the two Dutch studies of 2011 and 2014, still regarded worldwide as the best evidence, have been criticised methodologically (NJB article). A protocol that prescribes an irreversible intervention in children cannot lean on an evidentiary position that has been judged inadequate elsewhere.
With that, the first pillar gives way. What is meant to serve as scientific underpinning is, in the authors' view, too thin to carry the gravity of the treatment. See also evidence base weakness and the methodological criticism of the Amsterdam studies.
Condition 2 โ the ethical charge is in fact heavy
A protocol may serve as a technical-medical yardstick only where its ethical charge is limited. With puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones administered to minors, the opposite holds. The intervention bears on fertility, sexual function, and physical development in ways that cannot, or can barely, be undone โ and it is deployed in children for whom, the authors ask, it is doubtful that they can process the information needed for informed consent while in deep mental distress.
Precisely because deeply contested value judgements are at stake, the medical profession cannot settle the matter as an internal, technical standard. The weighing belongs in a broader social and legal debate, not in a protocol a court adopts uncritically. See ethical criticism โ informed consent in minors.
Condition 3 โ the development process was deficient
The third condition concerns procedure. A norm-setting protocol must arise through a controlled, transparent, and validated process, with independent review and room for dissent. The authors point out that no systematic review underlies the Dutch Protocol (2018), as the guideline for developing clinical guidelines requires, and that the working group consisted of twelve people, five of whom are (now) affiliated with the VUmc gender clinic and two with the patient organisation Transvisie; the substantive review by the signatory professional organisations was limited.
The third pillar is therefore missing too. A protocol that has not been tempered by a sound process cannot bear the legal authority it would need in a liability case.
Other countries are pulling back
The authors point out that the United Kingdom, Finland and Sweden are reforming their approach. In the United Kingdom the NHS ordered the Tavistock clinic to stop its activities in July 2022, after the interim report of the Cass Review, and announced in June 2023 that puberty-suppressing hormones outside a research setting are no longer to be regarded as usual care; in Sweden, the National Board of Health and Welfare recommended in December 2022 that these treatments be provided in the context of research and otherwise only in exceptional cases (source). When leading health systems restrict the treatment because the underpinning falls short, the claim that the protocol is the governing standard in the Netherlands weakens further still.
The legal consequence
Because the Dutch Protocol satisfies none of the three conditions, a court may not simply adopt it as the standard for good clinical practice. A physician who invokes the protocol in a liability case cannot hide behind it: the protocol offers no safe harbour. The duty of care must then be assessed independently โ and in that assessment the weak evidence base counts against the physician. See how this plays out across the three legal tracks and the informed-consent route.
A follow-up: the Health Council and the regulatory climate
In a later piece Smeehuijzen shifts his focus to regulation. In NJB 2025/2811 he examines whether the advisory process of the Dutch Health Council on puberty suppression in minors meets the requirements of independence and care: he analyses the composition of the advisory committee (twelve members, six of whom are or were directly or indirectly involved in prescribing or administering puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones; NJB article), the risk of conflicts of interest, and the wider regulatory climate in which the treatment is kept in place. The thread running through both pieces is the same โ in the authors' view, the institutional safeguards that ought to support this intervention do not hold under scrutiny. The Health Council published its advice on 30 June 2026; it saw no reason to organise the care differently, but advised strengthening the due-care requirements in the revision of the Quality Standard (source).
More in this dossier
Sources
- J.L. Smeehuijzen, J. Smids & C. Hoekstra, "Transgenderzorg aan kinderen. Juridische bedenkingen bij het Dutch Protocol (2018)" [Transgender care for children. Legal objections to the Dutch Protocol (2018)], NJB 2023/1772, issue 25, 14 July 2023 (blog of 20 July 2023). Online at njb.nl.
- J.L. Smeehuijzen, "De Gezondheidsraad en het reguleringsklimaat rond puberteitsremming bij minderjarigen" [The Health Council and the regulatory climate around puberty suppression in minors], NJB 2025/2811, issue 40, 19 December 2025 (blog of 9 January 2026). Online at njb.nl.
- Author page Lodewijk Smeehuijzen, Nederlands Juristenblad, njb.nl/auteurs/lodewijk-smeehuijzen.